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We identify the causal effect of compulsory military service on conscripts’ subse-
quent labour-market outcomes by exploiting the regression-discontinuity design of 
the military draft in Germany during the 1950s. Unbiased estimates of military ser-
vice on lifetime earnings, wages, and employment are obtained by comparing men 
born before July 1, 1937 (the “White Cohort”) who were exempted from compulsory 
military service to men who were born on or shortly after this threshold date and 
hence faced a positive probability of being drafted. We find that the putative earn-
ings advantage and wage premium of those who served in the armed forces vanish 
when selection effects are taken into account. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Wir identifizieren im Folgenden den kausalen Effekt der Wehrdienstpflicht für einge-
zogene Personen im Bezug auf den Arbeitsmarkt, in dem wir das regressions-
discontinuity Design der Wehrpflicht in Deutschland während der 1950er untersu-
chen. Unverzerrte Schätzer des Wehrdienstes auf lebenslange Bezüge, Arbeitslöh-
ne und Beschäftigung werden durch einen Vergleich von Männern erzielt, die vor 
dem 1.  Juli 1937 (die „Weiße Kohorte“) geboren und damit von der Wehrdienst-
pflicht befreit waren, mit Männern, die an diesem als Grenze festgesetzten Tag oder 
kurz darauf geboren wurden und demzufolge eine positive Wahrscheinlichkeit auf-
weisen eingezogen zu werden. Als Ergebnis ist festzuhalten, dass der vermeintliche 
Einkommensvorteil und der durchschnittliche Mehrverdienst für die Personen, die 
dem Militär dienten, verschwinden, wenn Selektionseffekte berücksichtigt werden. 
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Keywords: causal effect, quasi experimental estimators, conscription 
 
Acknowledgements: We gratefully acknowledge the comments and suggestions  
of Daniel Baumgarten, Tobias Klein, Bruno van der Linden, and Justin Smith. All 
remaining shortcomings are the authors’ responsibility. A.R. Paloyo thanks the 
Leibniz Association for the financial support through the RGS Econ. Corresponden-
ce: Thomas K. Bauer, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, 
Hohenzollernstr. 1–3, 45128 Essen, Germany; thomas.bauer@rwi-essen.de. 
IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2009  4 IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2009  5 
1  Introduction 
The recruitment of military personnel varies considerably across countries and over 
time. While a number of countries, such as the United Kingdom and the United 
States, has relied and continues to rely on all-volunteer forces, most European 
countries pursued a policy of compulsory military service (CMS). However, since the 
end of the Cold War, many European countries recently changed towards all-
volunteer forces (e.g., France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and many Eastern European 
countries) or are planning to do so in the near future (e.g., Albania, Serbia, Sweden, 
and Ukraine). Yet many European countries are not planning to abandon the military 
draft (e.g., Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, Germany, and Greece) despite on-going 
discussions in most of these countries to do so. 
Many economic arguments suggest that a professional army should be preferred 
because of structural inefficiencies and potential long-run costs that may arise in a 
draft system. Until recently, much less attention has been put on the long-run effects 
of CMS for the conscripts, both in the economic literature and the public discus-
sion.
1 Draftees have to serve in a period of their life that is usually characterized by 
human capital investments, which is disrupted by the military service. They may 
further suffer from a deterioration of their human capital stock during service. Even 
though the long-run effects of CMS may be even more important than the structural 
inefficiencies, empirical evidence on these long-run effects is rather scarce. 
                                                
This paper emphasizes the long-run effects of conscription by analyzing the effects 
of CMS on subsequent labour market outcomes in Germany. However, identifying 
these effects is problematic for several reasons. Whether someone is drafted for 
CMS is partially determined by factors which are directly related to labour-market 
outcomes, such as health status. Access to information on characteristics which 
determine draft status would enable the researcher to identify the causal effects of 
military service by correcting for selection bias. However, these variables are usually 
not available to the researcher. 
In reaction to such deficiencies, previous studies relied on instrumental-variable (IV) 
estimates (Angrist 1990; Angrist and Krueger 1994; Imbens and van der Klaauw 
1995). These efforts found either a negative effect or no effect of military service on 
subsequent earnings. For instance, using the year of birth as an instrument for the 
probability to be drafted for the Vietnam War, Angrist (1990) estimated that ten 
years after the war, white veterans realized approximately 15 percent lower annual 
wages than non-veterans. However, the wage differentials between non-white vet-
erans and non-veterans were not statistically significant. Based on IV estimates that 
utilize the relationship between the date of birth and veteran status, Angrist and 
Krueger (1994) found that World War II veterans earn the same as non-veterans, if 
 
1   See Lau, Poutvaara, and Wagener (2004) and Keller, Poutvaara, and Wagener (2008) 
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not less. Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995) used variations in the probability to be 
drafted for CMS across birth cohorts to instrument for military service. They show 
that ten years after CMS in the Netherlands, those who served earn on average 5 
percent less than those who did not serve. 
In our analysis, we complement traditional estimation methods with a regression-
discontinuity (RD) approach to obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of CMS on-
subsequent labour-market outcomes.
2 The RD design used here is based on a dis-
continuity in the probability to be drafted for CMS across birth cohorts in Germany. 
When creating the new armed forces in the second half of the fifties, all men born 
before July 1, 1937 were exempted from CMS. On the other hand, men born on July 
1, 1937 and after faced a positive probability of being drafted. Based on this rule, we 
use observations on the so-called “White Cohort” (Weißer Jahrgang in German, i.e., 
men who neither served during World War II nor were required to perform CMS) as 
a control group.
3 
Cross-sectional comparisons of the labour-market outcomes for men who served in 
the Bundeswehr with those who did not indicate that those men who served appar-
ently enjoy a wage premium. This premium, together with the fact that they remain 
employed longer than those who did not enter the armed forces, translate to a life-
time earnings advantage of about 17 percent. However, we find that the superior 
labour-market performance of the draftees is merely the result of the non-random 
selection mechanism used at that time to admit conscripts. The wage, employment, 
and earnings differentials vanish when we control for selection bias. 
2  Compulsory military service in Germany 
The membership of West Germany in NATO required the creation of the 
Bundeswehr with a projected maximum strength of around 500,000 soldiers. The 
West German parliament decided at this time that the Bundeswehr should be com-
posed largely of conscripted men. The corresponding law regulating the introduction 
                                                  
2  The RD approach was introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960). It has recently 
been used, for example, by van der Klaauw (2002) to investigate the effects of financial 
aid on college enrollment, by Black (1999) to evaluate the effect of elementary-school 
quality on housing prices, and by Angrist and Lavy (1999) to identify the effect of class 
size on schooling attainment. Furthermore, Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw (1999) ana-
lyze the effect of an anti-discrimination law on minority employment in small US firms, 
DiNardo and Lee (2004) estimate the effect of unionization on establishment closure and 
wages, and Lee (2008) analyzes whether political incumbency provides an advantage in 
elections to public office. Closest in objective to our paper is the study by Buonanno 
(2006) who looks at the long-term effects of conscription on earnings and educational at-
tainment in the UK. 
3  It is important to note that in the studies of Angrist (1990) and Angrist and Krueger 
(1994), the samples include people who were actually in a war. Our sample excludes 
people who were in combat duty. This might explain the negative impact of serving in the 
Vietnam War on the earnings of veterans. However, updated estimates by Angrist and 
Chen (2008) using the same instrumental variable show effects that are nearly zero in 
later periods of the life cycle. IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2009  7 
of CMS passed the parliament in July 1956. According to this law, all able-bodied 
men born after June 30, 1937 have to serve in the armed forces. The first 10,000 
conscripts entered in May 1957 and they had to serve for 12 months.
4 
In principle, the regulations governing conscription are simple. All men of a particu-
lar birth cohort are called for medical and psychological evaluations around their 18
th 
birthday. Based on these examinations, they are divided into three groups: (a) those 
with good health are categorized as being fit for service; (b) men with smaller health 
problems are temporarily deferred from service; and (c) men with severe health 
problems are immediately exempted from military service. Even if the medical and 
psychological evaluations state that a person is fit to serve, there are various other 
factors that can lead to an exemption from military service. First, volunteers to the 
police, the Federal Border Guard, the Peace Corps, and disaster-control workers as 
well as priests are exempted. Finally, those who have been sentenced to prison 
because of high treason or the endangering of outer security are not drafted. 
The existing economic literature on the individual effects of CMS in Germany con-
centrates on the implicit income tax placed on the conscripts. This tax equals the 
difference between the income that those who serve could earn in the civilian mar-
ket and the usually lower income from military service. Using aggregate data for 
1995, Schleicher (1996) calculates that the direct monthly opportunity costs of ser-
vice for the average German conscript are approximately €1,950. The total cost of 
compulsory military and civil service resulting from this implicit tax amounts to more 
than 27 percent of the official defence budget in 1995. Similar numbers are reported 
by Schäfer (2000).
5 Because of the various exemptions from military service, this 
implicit income tax is not equally distributed among the male population. Although 
these opportunity costs and externalities are important, we do not aim to estimate 
them here. We instead focus on the potential effects of CMS on labour-market out-
comes after the service. 
The long-term costs of CMS on subsequent labour-market outcomes could be ex-
pected to be numerically at least as important as the direct opportunity costs of ser-
vice, if not more. Usually, potential recruits are not immediately drafted after either 
their health examinations or the end of their temporary exemptions. They will rarely 
                                                  
4   In 1962, the duration of CMS was extended to 18 months and has changed several times 
since then. In West Germany, women were exempted from CMS. Women were allowed 
to work voluntarily for the military only in medical professions. In January 2001, the law 
allowing women to enter combat duty came into force. For conscientious objectors, the 
German constitution as well as the law on CMS provides the opportunity to perform an al-
ternative type of service. This alternative service mainly comprises auxiliary activities in 
the health-care sector. In the birth cohorts relevant for the empirical analysis, the fraction 
of conscientious objectors is small. The first 340 conscientious objectors started their ser-
vice in April 1961. Until the 1970s, the annual number of conscientious objectors stayed 
at a negligible level (Haberhauer and Maneval 2000). 
5   In the US, the direct costs of military service received increasing attention already in the 
1960s. See, among others, Bailey and Cargill (1969), Davis and Palomba (1968), Fisher 
(1969), Hansen and Weisbrod (1967), Oi (1967), and Spencer and Woroniak (1969). be able to foresee when exactly they will be called to serve. Due to this uncertainty, 
it may be difficult for them to find permanent employment. They may be obliged to 
accept casual employment and are more likely to be unemployed (Oi 1967). This 
tenuous labour-market status during the waiting period may have detrimental effects 
on the human capital of potential recruits in terms of lower job training or occupa-
tion-specific skills. Hence, it may result in relatively lower earnings and worse em-
ployment prospects even after military service. It has further been argued that con-
scripts suffer from a deterioration of their human-capital stock during their time of 
service (Spencer and Woroniak 1969). Since the wages paid by the armed forces to 
the conscripts are in most cases lower than their market wage, armed forces that 
rely on conscription usually suffer from an inefficiently low capital-labour ratio. This 
further suggests that the armed forces have no incentive to use the human capital of 
conscripts in an efficient way and to allocate them to appropriate jobs within the mili-
tary sector. 
However, military service may also have positive effects on the human-capital stock 
of the conscripts and hence enhance their labour-market performance. During mili-
tary service, conscripts may acquire soft skills such as working in a team and in a 
strict hierarchical structure. These skills may be rewarded in the civilian labour mar-
ket. Furthermore, performing CMS may be used by potential employers as a signal 
for good health status or a high sense of responsibility, resulting in positive statisti-
cal discrimination in favour of those who served. This preferential treatment that 
former conscripts could potentially receive in the labour market could translate into a 
wage premium. 
Overall, the long-term labour-market effects of CMS are not easily predictable. As 
discussed above, there are convincing arguments on both sides such that the ulti-
mate effect is uncertain. However, any such effect—positive or negative—assumes 
that the resulting differential performance in the labour market is caused by military 
service. We contribute to the analysis by estimating the net effect with what we be-
lieve is a solid econometric identification strategy that controls for the likely selection 
bias that arises in conscription. 
3  Regression-discontinuity design 
Investigating the effects of CMS on subsequent labour-market outcomes presents a 
classical evaluation problem. Since men are either drafted or not drafted, we do not 
observe a single individual in both states. Consider any generic labour-market out-
come of interest, say, lifetime earnings. Suppose that this outcome is determined by 
the equation: 
  , (1) 
where   denotes the lifetime earnings of individual  ,   is the treatment indicator 
that equals   if individual   performed CMS and   otherwise, and   is a stochas-
tic disturbance term. Our parameter of interest is  , 
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which is the earnings premium or penalty of serving in the Bundeswehr. If treatment 
is non-random, simple OLS estimates of   will be biased since  . Such a 
selection bias in the estimate of   could occur, for example, because the health 
status of an individual affects both the probability to be drafted for CMS and lifetime 
earnings  . In the RD approach, additional information about discontinuities in the 
probability to be selected into treatment   is used to obtain consistent 
estimates of  .
6 
Apart from the treatment indicator  , let   be in indicator variable that equals 1 if 
a man was born at or after July 1, 1937 and 0 otherwise. One could thus distinguish 
three groups: men born before July 1, 1937 (the White Cohort) who were altogether 
exempted from military service (  and  ); men born at or after July 1, 
1937 who could in principle be drafted for military service but who were exempted 
due to one of the reasons described in the last section ( ,  ); and men 
born at or after July 1, 1937 who were drafted for CMS ( ,  ). Hence, 
for the full sample of individuals, the conditional probability of receiving treatment   
is known to be discontinuous at a threshold value  , i.e., the date of birth that sepa-
rates the White Cohort from the rest. 
The literature on the RD approach typically differentiates between two types of dis-
continuities (Trochim 1984). The case where treatment   is known to depend on 
 in a deterministic way is called the sharp design. If   depends on   in a sto-
chastic way, it is called the fuzzy design. Note that our case could be considered a 
mixture of the sharp and fuzzy designs.
7 Let   denote the threshold birthday of July 
1, 1937. We know that men born before   are exempted from military service, i.e., 
, whereas the probability to be drafted for military service is a 
function of some individual characteristics  , such as health status, for those born 
at or after  , i.e.,  . 
The RD approach makes use of the expectation that individuals who are just below 
the threshold value   are similar in their observed and unobserved characteristics to 
individuals who are just above   but for the probability of being selected into treat-
ment. Hence, the distribution of observed and unobserved characteristics of indi-
viduals born just before July 1, 1937 will be arbitrarily close to the distribution of ob-
served and unobserved characteristics of individuals born at or just after this date, 
                                                  
6   We give a cursory treatment of RD designs here. For a more thorough discussion, includ-
ing the asymptotic behaviour of these estimators, the interested reader is referred to the 
authoritative article of Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw (2001). 
7   Battistin and Rettore (2008) call this the “partially fuzzy design”. i.e., for individuals born near the cut-off point, it could be expected that 
, where   denotes an arbitrarily small number. 
Assuming that the unknown parameter   in   is an independent 
assignment error, i.e.,  , the treatment parameter   can be consistently 
estimated by implementing the regression: 
  , (2) 
where   is a control function that is continuous in   and represents a specifica-
tion of  . However, if   is not independent of   given  , the estimate of   in 
Equation (1) is biased. The resulting selection bias depends on   and 
may take any sign (van der Klaauw 2002). 
The literature on the RD approach suggests two solutions to this selection-bias 
problem. Van der Klaauw (2002) proposes a two-step estimation procedure. Let 
 if   and   otherwise. In the first step, the propensity score is 
estimated using 
  , (3) 
where   is some function of   that is continuous in  . In the second stage,   
in Equation (2) is replaced by the first-stage estimates of  : 
  . (4) 
If the functions for   and   are specified correctly, Equation (4) produces 
consistent estimates of the treatment effect  . If   and   are modelled pa-
rametrically using the same functional form, this two-stage procedure reduces to a 
standard 2SLS IV estimator, where   and   are used as instruments (and are 
hence assumed to be orthogonal to  ). (Wald 1940) 
In our empirical analysis, we constrain   to be equal to   and then proceed 
to estimate the system of Equations (3) and (4) twice: (a) using a higher-order poly-
nomial and (b) a restricted cubic spline of the difference in days of an individual's 
date of birth   and the threshold date  . We further use three quarter-of-birth 
dummies and two dummies representing the educational attainment of an individual. 
An advantage of this two-step approach is that the identification of   uses all obser-
vations over  . One limitation is that it is more fragile towards misspecification be-
cause consistent estimates of   crucially depend on the correct specification of 
 and  . 
To overcome this deficiency, Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw (2001) propose a 
non-parametric approach. Assume that both   and the conditional mean 
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function   are continuous at  . Assuming further that the treatment effect is 
constant across different individuals, the average treatment effect is identified as the 
following ratio: 
  . (5) 
The limits  ,  ,  , and   can be estimated using one-sided kernel regres-
sions. The advantage of this approach compared to the two-step estimation proce-
dure suggested by van der Klaauw (2002) is that it does not require the specification 
of   and   or indeed the inclusion of any other covariate.
8 However, a dis-
advantage is that the treatment effect is estimated using only observations near the 
threshold   and that non-parametric estimation of the limits requires the choice of a 
kernel function and of an appropriate bandwidth. Because of the poor boundary per-
formance of standard kernel estimators, Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw (2001) 
propose the use of local linear regressions suggested by Fan (1992) to estimate the 
limits. 
The denominator in Equation (5) is nonzero because   is discon-
tinuous at  . Our case represents a mixture between the sharp and the fuzzy RD 
designs because   always equals 0. Hence, the average treatment effect is identi-
fied by 
  . (6) 
Viewed from this practical perspective, the sharp RD design is essentially a special 
case of its fuzzy counterpart where the estimate of the jump around the cut-off for 
the outcome variable is not rescaled by the jump in the probability of treatment (Lee 
and Lemieux 2009). More accurately, however, the partially fuzzy design requires 
only the same regularity conditions needed for identification in a sharp RD design. 
(Battistin and Rettore 2008) 
One could think of the fuzzy RD estimator as a “local” estimator in two ways. First, a 
limitation of the RD approach is that the treatment effect can only be identified for 
persons with values of   that are near  . Second, in this neighborhood, the treat-
ment effect is identified only for the “compliers” or that sub-group of individuals for 
whom the probability of treatment changes discontinuously at   (Imbens and Le-
mieux 2008). Allowing for heterogeneous treatment effects requires the additional 
assumption that treatment   is independent of   conditional on being near the 
                                                  
8   Covariates can be included with the aim of reducing sampling variability. Nevertheless, 
as long as the assumptions underlying identification is fulfilled, the RD estimator will be 
unbiased. (Lee and Lemieux 2009) IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2009  12 
threshold   (local conditional independence assumption), i.e., that the potential 
costs of or returns to treatment do not change the behaviour of individuals in such a 
way that they try to influence the treatment probability.
9 Under this assumption, the 
ratio defined in Equation (5) identifies a local average treatment effect (LATE) in the 
sense proposed by Imbens and Angrist (1994). As such, the external validity of RD 
estimates is not apparent
10 but its internal validity is widely believed to be unparal-
leled by other quasi-experimental methods relied upon to draw causal inferences 
(Imbens and Wooldridge 2009; Lee and Lemieux 2009). 
4  Data construction and description 
We use process-generated German register data provided by the Institute for Em-
ployment Research (IAB) and generated by an integrated notifying procedure for the 
public health insurance, statutory pension scheme, and unemployment insurance, 
which was introduced in 1973. By law, employers have to provide information to the 
social security agencies for employees acquiring claims to the social security sys-
tem. These notifications are required at the start and end of any employment rela-
tionship. In addition, employers are obliged to provide an annual report for each 
employee who is employed on the 31st of December of each year and covered by 
social insurance. The reports include information on sex, year of birth, nationality, 
occupation, qualification, as well as the gross wage rate of the employee. According 
to the obligation to register with the state pension authorities, the data encompass 
all persons who have paid contributions to the pension system or who have been 
covered by the pension system through contributions by the unemployment insur-
ance. As a consequence, certain groups of employees (e.g., temporary civil ser-
vants or self-employed persons) are not covered by the data. 
We combine the IAB employment sample with additional administrative data as-
sembled at the state pension authorities (IAB employment supplement sample; IAB-
S). Both datasets can be linked by the social security number. The matched file con-
tains a 1-percent random sample of the total German population that was gainfully 
employed for at least one day between 1975 and 1995 (for details, see Bender, 
Haas and Klose (2000)).
11 Note that the IAB-S is an event-data set, which enables 
us to obtain labour-market information on a daily basis. 
                                                  
9   When economic agents can precisely manipulate their behaviour at the cut-off point, the 
RD design fails to identify any meaningful treatment effect (Lee 2008; Urquiola and Ver-
hoogen 2009). However, as long as the manipulation is imprecise, the situation in a small 
neighborhood around the discontinuity can still be considered a local random experiment 
for which the RD approach is well-suited (Lee and Lemieux 2009). 
10  Although that is debatable. See, e.g., the discussion in Lee and Lemieux (2009) and their 
interpretation of the gap at the cut-off point as a “weighted average treatment effect” that 
is generalizable. 
11  A new version of the IAB-S will be available for researchers via the Research Data Cen-
ter of the German Employment Agency in the Institute for Employment Research (RDC-
IAB) in 2011. See http://fdz.iab.de/en/FDZ_Projects/BASID.aspx/. The IAB-S offers several advantages. First, as opposed to other datasets in Ger-
many, the IAB-S allows identification of persons who served in the Bundeswehr. In 
particular, we can distinguish between regular employment, unemployment, and 
other “non-active” states such as maternity leave, illness, disability, full-time educa-
tion, and military service. The dataset also has exact information on the date of birth 
which allows us to separate persons in the White Cohort from persons who faced a 
positive probability of being drafted for military service. Finally, it is large enough to 
have sufficient observations around the threshold date of July 1, 1937 to meaning-
fully apply the RD approach. 
From the original sample, we deleted all females, East Germans, and all persons 
that lived outside of West Germany at one point in time, including foreigners and 
ethnic German immigrants. We further restricted our analysis to persons born be-
tween January 1, 1934 and December 31, 1940 who worked for at least one day in 
our sample period. The latter selection was mainly driven by the desire to capture a 
symmetric range of birth cohorts around the threshold year of 1937 and to limit the 
probability that a non-negligible fraction of individuals in our sample serves in alter-
native functions other than military service. Furthermore, individuals in the sample 
should not serve more than 12 months. Thus, we are able to concentrate our em-
pirical analysis on those men who were in the Bundeswehr with the same duration 
of service. Professional soldiers and those who started CMS and then decided to 
become professional soldiers have also been dropped from our sample. 
Figure 1 shows the average number of conscripts by date of birth. The figure shows 
that about 18 percent of the men born in July 1937 have been drafted for military 
service. The share of conscripts is slightly decreasing for men born between July 
1937 and August 1938 and is sharply increasing for men born after the middle of 
1938. This development could be explained by temporary frictions in building up the 
Bundeswehr in the initial years and the gradual intensification of the Cold War. In 
addition, several special exemptions applied in the first years of the Bundeswehr. 
For example, sole sons of a soldier killed in World War II or a soldier still missing 
were exempted. This rule applied to about 10 percent of the men in the birth cohorts 
from 1937 to 1944 (Wehrstruktur-Kommission 1971). Those who lost all brothers or 
all sisters could also request for an exemption. Additionally, persons who are exam-
ined to be fit for service could defer the draft if they face a personal, economic, or 
occupational situation in which the draft would be a serious hardship. This defer-
ment could result in a permanent exemption when these persons reached the 
maximum age limit of 25 for the initiation of military service. According to the 
Wehrstruktur-Kommission (1971), about 3.5 percent of all men in a birth cohort re-
ceived a permanent exemption from military service in the 1960s because they were 
older than 25. 
As a composite indicator of labour-market success, we consider the cumulative real 
earnings from 1963 to 1988. We also investigate the effect of CMS on the cumula-
tive days of employment within the same period. Differences in real wages at differ-
ent points in the life cycle and cumulative earnings might be the result of differences 
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in accumulated labour-market experience due to distinct probabilities of becoming 
unemployed, sick, or leaving the labour market. Therefore, we also analyze the ef-
fects of CMS on lifetime average daily wage, defined as the cumulative earnings 
divided by the cumulative days of employment. Finally, we consider the real daily 
gross wage for each year in the sample. 
Table 1 and Figures 2 and 3 report some descriptive statistics of the variables used 
in our analysis. In Table 1, the cumulative lifetime earnings and lifetime average 
daily wage of individuals from the White Cohort are less than those born at or after 
July 1, 1937. For the lifetime average daily wage and educational attainment, the 
differences are statistically significant. However, this difference disappears when we 
restrict the sample to those born in 1937.
12 The reported real daily wages at age 30, 
40, and 50 show the typical concave pattern over the life cycle that could be ob-
served in almost all developed countries. 
Throughout the life cycle, individuals that served in the military earn more than both 
individuals from the White Cohort and individuals born after July 1, 1937 who were 
not drafted for military service. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show the age–earnings profiles 
by group for the full sample and the sample of individuals born in 1937, respectively. 
Those who served in the Bundeswehr earn more than both those who did not serve 
and those from the White Cohort. Note that the respective earnings differentials are 
smaller if we restrict our sample to individuals born in 1937. A similar picture 
emerges if we look at lifetime average wages, cumulative days of employment, and 
cumulative lifetime earnings, which are depicted in Figures 3(a), 3(b), and 3(c), re-
spectively. The differences between those who served in the military and the rest of 
the sample are even starker in these graphs. Draftees seem to enjoy a remarkable 
advantage over non-draftees. However, these simple comparisons do not inform us 
about the causal impact of CMS on labour-market outcomes because of the selec-
tion mechanism which we have yet to take into account. 
5  Estimation Results 
5.1  OLS Results 
The estimated returns to military service obtained by OLS regressions are shown in 
Figure 4 and Table 2. The estimated coefficients in Figure 4 are obtained from OLS 
regressions of (log) real daily gross wage on a dummy variable indicating whether 
an individual served in the Bundeswehr, two education dummies
13, age, and quar-
ter-of-birth dummies. These regressions are performed separately for each year in 
                                                  
12  These tests are available upon request. 
13  We use the term “high school” to refer to indivduals who have successfully completed 
either an apprenticeship or the Abitur, the qualification exam to enter university. “Univer-
sity” is reserved for those who earned a degree from a Hochschule (tertiary education), 
which is not the same as secondary education referred to by its literal English translation 
into “high school”. The reference category is non-completion of an apprenticeship, an 
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the sample. The figure shows that for both sub-samples depicted, the returns to mili-
tary service are slightly increasing over time. Using the full sample (Figure 4(a)), the 
estimated returns to military service starts out at almost 1 percent in 1963 and ends 
at about 3 percent in 1988. Using only individuals born between 1936 and 1938 pro-
vides a somewhat similar picture (Figure 4(b)) although the standard errors of the 
estimates are naturally higher because of the reduced sample size. 
Table 2 shows the estimated returns to military service when using lifetime average 
daily wage, cumulative days of employment, and cumulative lifetime earnings as 
dependent variables, with the aforementioned controls present in the regressions. 
Using the full sample, the results suggest that over their entire life cycle, those who 
served in the Bundeswehr have wages that are about 4.6 percent higher than the 
wages of those who have been exempted or are born before July 1, 1937 (Panel A, 
Column (2) of Table 2). In terms of the effect of CMS on the number of days of em-
ployment (Panel B), we find that those who served in the Bundeswehr work 13 per-
cent more days than their counterparts who did not enter the armed forces. Taken 
together, these effects amount to a cumulative lifetime earnings (Panel C) advan-
tage of about 17 percent. The results are very similar when restricting the sample to 
those born in the period 1936–1938. 
5.2  RD Results 
The estimated returns to military service using OLS are biased due to the non-
random selection of the conscripts described in Section 2. We account for this by 
presenting RD estimates in Table 3 and Figure 5. In Table 3, the results for Panel A 
are based on 2SLS regressions while the estimates for Panel B come from local 
linear regressions. For the 2SLS procedure, we use a quartic polynomial of the dif-
ference between an individual’s date of birth and   measured in days and its inter-
action with a dummy variable which equals 1 for non-White Cohort observations.
14  
This appears in both the first-stage and the second-stage regressions (i.e.,  is 
equal to  ; see Equations (3) and (4)), with the indicator variable serving as the 
lone excluded instrument. Alternatively, both   and   are modelled as cubic 
splines (piecewise cubic polynomials) to more flexibly account for non-linearities. 
Quarter-of-birth and level-of-education controls further serve as included instru-
ments. The point estimates indicate that those who served in the Bundeswehr have 
a cumulative lifetime earnings disadvantage of about 2 to 8 percent. However, this is 
mostly driven by the reduction in the days of employment (as high as 16 percent 
                                                  
14  We proceed to estimate the system using 2SLS despite the binary nature of the endoge-
nous variable since consistent estimation of the parameter of interest in the second stage 
is unaffected by a linear approximation of the conditional expectation function in the first 
stage (Heckman 1978; Angrist and Krueger1994). However, the standard errors are clus-
tered at the day of birth to allow for an arbitrary correlation structure within each cohort 
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based on the polynomial regressions) since the lifetime average daily wage actually 
increases (Columns (1) and (2)). However, these returns are imprecisely estimated. 
Local linear estimates are presented in Figure 5 and Panel B of Table 3. The limits 
,  , and   described in Equation (6) are estimated using local linear regres-
sions around the point of discontinuity. In Figure 5, we graphically represent the dif-
ference between   and  . From the confidence-interval bands, one can see that 
there is no statistical difference between the estimates on both sides of the thresh-
old.
15 However, the point estimates at the cut-off give an indication of the direction 
of the causal impact of CMS on labour-market outcomes which are consistent with 
the 2SLS estimates. 
In Panel B of Table 3, we report estimates based on two different kernels (triangular 
and rectangular) and three different bandwidth choices. The preferred bandwidth is 
derived through a “rule of thumb” (see StataCorp (2007) for details); we then re-
estimate the model with the preferred bandwidth reduced by 50 percent and then 
again increased by 50 percent. The direction of the estimates from the parametric 
regressions in Panel A carries over to the non-parametric setup in Panel B. The im-
precision over the estimates is also sustained. One reason for the inflated standard 
errors is the drastic reduction in the sample size over which the estimates are com-
puted. This can be seen more clearly when one compares the standard errors ob-
tained from different bandwidths. The smallest window (50 percent of the preferred 
bandwidth) has the highest standard errors across the board. As the imprecision 
over the estimates is driven by the methodology itself, we would like to think of this 
set of non-parametric estimates as primarily a robustness check on the polynomial- 
and spline-based estimates presented in Panel A. Thus, in terms of the direction of 
the causal effect of CMS on labour-market outcomes, the parametric estimates us-
ing the whole sample are confirmed by the local linear regression results. 
5.3  Validity of the RD Design 
The validity of the RD approach largely rests on the assumption that individuals near 
the threshold value   are similar with regard to their observed and unobserved 
characteristics. If this assumption were true, an implication is that the distribution of 
covariates that are presumably not affected by the forcing variable   should be 
continuous at  . This is similar in spirit to placebo regressions that are now com-
monly done in the evaluation literature. Unfortunately, the IAB-S provides only lim-
ited information on those characteristics of the individuals which are determined 
before a potential draft (i.e., the traits unaffected by military service). The only vari-
able which largely satisfies these requirements is educational attainment. For most 
men, pre-university schooling is already completed at the time of their draft. How-
ever, for those planning to graduate from university, the draft usually occurs be-
                                                  
15  The graphs are constructed using the triangular kernel. The graphs based on the rectan-
gular kernel look similar and are available from the authors. IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2009  17 
tween the completion of high school and the start of university education. For these 
men, the draft defers university education but does not necessarily affect the deci-
sion to obtain a university degree.
16 In our case, we see this most obviously in Fig-
ure 6(a), where the share of men who completed the qualification exam to enter 
university is rendered over the running variable. 
Another piece of evidence to support the RD approach is the continuous distribution 
(over the threshold) of other covariates that could affect the outcome variables used 
in the analysis. If these variables are continuous at the critical point, then the 
change in the outcome variable could entirely be attributed to the treatment. In Fig-
ure 6(b), we observe that there is a slight discontinuity in the share of men who 
completed a university degree but the difference is small and also well-within the 95-
percent confidence intervals. Taken together, the behaviour of the other covariates 
over the forcing variable lead credence to the RD approach taken here. 
Finally, we test for possible discontinuities in the sample where there should be no 
discontinuity. To implement this test, we split the sample into non-White Cohort and 
White Cohort observations. For each of the sub-samples, we take the median of the 
forcing variable and simulate a discontinuity at this value of  . Then, we estimate 
the impact of this simulated discontinuity on the outcome variables. We expect that 
there should be no significant effect on labour-market outcomes (i.e., that there 
should be no discontinuity in  ) since, in reality, there was no treatment at this 
point. Indeed, these placebo regressions indicate that there are no unexpected dis-
continuities that could put into question the RD design.
17 
5.4  Alternative IV Results 
As noted above, the RD design identifies a LATE that may not be generalizable to 
birth cohorts other than those around the threshold date. We therefore present al-
ternative IV results with which to compare the RD estimates. Here, we follow Imbens 
and van der Klaauw (1995) by using variations in the average conscription rate by 
month of birth as an instrument for serving in the Bundeswehr. The probability to be 
drafted depends, among other things, on the size of the birth cohort. With a rela-
tively constant demand for conscripts, the Bundeswehr tacitly tightens its require-
ments for enlistment in the case of a large birth cohort while it loosens these same 
requirements when a birth cohort yields less potential draftees. The control variables 
are the same as the ones used for the OLS estimates discussed in Section 5.1. 
                                                  
16  Those persons who are categorized to be fit for service and start their university educa-
tion before being drafted could apply for a temporary exemption from military service until 
they receive their university degree. According to the law, however, they have to expect 
to be drafted before the maximum age limit of 25, irrespective of whether they finished 
their degree. Hence, there are strong incentives to enter military service before starting 
university education. The law further limits the possibilities to decide to go to university 
just to avoid the draft to military service. 
17  These tests are available upon request. While the RD estimates are local in two dimensions (they identify the treatment ef-
fect for the compliers around the neighbourhood of the discontinuity), the IV esti-
mates presented here are local only in the sense that they identify the treatment 
effect for the compliers. We find that the estimates are not substantially different 
from the ones obtained using the RD approach. 
The results from these IV estimations are reported in Table 4 and Figure 7. In Table 
4, the returns to military service in terms of the lifetime average daily wage are posi-
tive and higher than the corresponding OLS estimates in Table 2. However, be-
cause of the reduction in the cumulative days of employment, the resulting esti-
mates for the effect on cumulative lifetime earnings are less than the OLS estimates. 
In Figures 7(a) and 7(b), the IV estimates of the impact of CMS on the (log) real 
daily gross wage show roughly the same evolution as Figures 4(a) and 4(b). Never-
theless, these point estimates do not statistically differ from 0. Ultimately, accounting 
for the selection effects during the draft through the use of an instrumental variable 
produces insignificant estimates of the returns to CMS. 
6  Conclusion 
The costs and benefits of serving in the military for the conscripts themselves have 
not been thoroughly examined in Germany. This issue is particularly relevant as 
policymakers are considering a shift from a system of conscription to that of volun-
tary enlistment. A proponent of maintaining conscription may point to the fact that, in 
terms of wages, employment, and lifetime earnings, men who served in the 
Bundeswehr end up performing better than those who did not serve. That is, the 
costs—if any—of performing military service are outweighed by its benefits. Such 
benefits may be due to the transfer of valued skills learned in the armed forces to 
the civilian labor market or outright preferential treatment for draftees. However, 
such a comparison would fail to take into account the manner in which these men 
were selected into the Bundeswehr. 
When we correct for the selection bias, we find that CMS has no long-run impact on 
the labour-market performance of conscripts. Therefore, the observed earnings dif-
ferential between conscripts and non-conscripts could entirely be attributed to the 
way the former were selected into the armed forces. Consider the likely case 
wherein these men are healthier than their rejected or exempted counterparts. To 
the extent that a better health status contributes to a better labour-market outcome, 
it would be reasonable to say that conscripts would have earned more even without 
serving in the Bundeswehr. We conclude that the observed differences between 
those who served and those who did not serve cannot be attributed to military ser-
vice. 
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Age–Earnings Profiles by Birth Cohort and Military Service 
 




(b) Birth Cohort 1937 
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Earnings and Employment Profiles by Birth Cohort and Military Service 
 




(b) Cumulative Days of Employment 
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(c) Cumulative Lifetime Earnings 
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OLS Estimates of the Returns to CMS on (log) Real Daily Gross Wage\ 
 




(b) Cohort 1936–1938 
Note:  Dashed lines encompass the 95-percent confidence interval. 
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Difference in the Outcome Variables at the Cut-off Point 
 




(b) Cumulative Days of Employment 
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(c) Cumulative Lifetime Earnings 
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Continuity of Covariates at the Cut-off Point 
 




(b) Share of Men who Completed University 
Note:   Local linear fits are surrounded by shaded areas that represent the 95-percent confidence 
intervals. 
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IV Estimates of the Returns to CMS on (log) Real Daily Wage 
 




(b) Cohort 1936–1938 
Notes:   Dashed lines encompass the 95-percent confidence interval. Instrument is average conscrip-
tion rate by month of birth. 
 
IAB-Discussion Paper 23/2009  30 Table 1 
Variable Means and Standard Deviations 
 
  Not White Cohort 
 
White Cohort 
Total  Drafted Not  Drafted 
Age in 1988  53.1880 49.6762  49.3060 49.7553 
  [1.0157] [0.9927]  [0.9681] [0.9799] 
No Educational Degree*  0.2799 0.2446  0.1701 0.2605 
  [0.4490] [0.4298]  [0.3758] [0.4389] 
Completed Apprenticeship*  0.6584 0.6791  0.7939 0.6545 
  [0.4743] [0.4669]  [0.4046] [0.4756] 
Passed Abitur*  0.0616 0.0764  0.0360 0.0850 
  [0.2405] [0.2656]  [0.1863] [0.2789] 
University Degree*  0.0513 0.0636  0.0294 0.0709 
  [0.2205] [0.2441]  [0.1689] [0.2567] 
(log) Cumulative Lifetime Earnings, 1963–1988  13.6600 13.6663  13.8285 13.6316 
  [0.8840] [0.7972]  [0.5155] [0.8413] 
(log) Lifetime Average Daily Wage, 1963–1988  4.8011 4.8218  4.8716 4.8112 
  [0.2822] [0.2740]  [0.2246] [0.2823] 
(log) Cumulative Days of Employment, 1963–1988  8.8589 8.8444  8.9569 8.8204 
  [0.7323] [0.6454]  [0.3889] [0.6856] 
(log) Real Daily Wage at Age 30†  4.3795 4.5840  4.6433 4.5706 
  [0.2809] [0.2905]  [0.2489] [0.2975] 
(log) Real Daily Wage at Age 40†  4.8695 4.9818  5.0190 4.9735 
  [0.2828] [0.2859]  [0.2363] [0.2952] 
(log) Real Daily Wage at Age 50†  5.0389 5.1060  5.1390 5.1011 
  [0.3271] [0.3363]  [0.2764] [0.3441] 
Observations  10,027 11,981  2,111 9,870 
 
Notes:   * indicates a dummy variable. Standard deviations are in brackets. † Since the dataset is not a 
balanced panel, the number of observations used to compute these summary statistics do not 




OLS Estimates of the Returns to CMS 
 
  Full Sample  Cohort 1936–1938 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: (log) Lifetime Average Daily Wage 
Military Service  0.0655*** 0.0466*** 0.0492*** 0.0461*** 
  [0.0052] [0.0053] [0.0099] [0.0097] 
High School  — 0.1925*** — 0.1945*** 
   [0.0042]  [0.0064] 
University  — 0.3998*** — 0.4056*** 
   [0.0083]  [0.0127] 
      
Panel B: (log) Cumulative Days of Employment 
Military Service  0.1171*** 0.1269*** 0.1388*** 0.1175*** 
  [0.0098] [0.0107] [0.0196] [0.0208] 
High School  — 0.2436*** — 0.2490*** 
   [0.0130]  [0.0217] 
University  — 0.1531*** — 0.1686*** 
   [0.0226]  [0.0343] 
      
Panel C: (log) Cumulative Lifetime Earnings 
Military Service  0.1826*** 0.1735*** 0.1880*** 0.1636*** 
  [0.0127] [0.0136] [0.0251] [0.0261] 
High School  — 0.4357*** — 0.4436*** 
   [0.0152]  [0.0235] 
University  — 0.5529*** — 0.5742*** 
   [0.0279]  [0.0423] 
Controls  No Yes No Yes 
Observations  22,008 9,322 
 
Notes:   Wage and earnings are in 1995 DM. Bracketed numbers are robust standard errors clustered at 
the day of birth. See text for the list of other control variables. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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RD Estimates of the Returns to CMS 
 
  (log) Lifetime Average 
Daily Wage 
(log) Cumulative Days of 
Employment 
(log) Cumulative Lifetime 
Earnings 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Global Polynomial- and Spline-Based 2SLS Estimates 
Military Service  0.0849 0.0335  −0.1607  −0.0530  −0.0759  −0.0195 
  [0.1271] [0.0964] [0.3188] [0.2456] [0.3900] [0.2986] 
F-statistic  34.44 271.27 34.44 271.27 34.44 271.24 
Partial R
2  0.0027 0.0045 0.0027 0.0045 0.0027 0.0045 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  22,008 22,008 22,008 
        
Panel B: Local Linear Regressions 
(i) Preferred Bandwidth 
Military Service  0.1021 0.0955  −0.3590  −0.3118  −0.2366  −0.3066 
  [0.2155] [0.2177] [0.5324] [0.5471] [0.6174] [0.7040] 
(ii) 50 Percent of Preferred Bandwidth 
Military Service  0.1521 0.1361  −0.5602  −0.7108  −0.3125  −0.9397 
  [0.4943] [0.7165] [1.4168] [7.6684] [1.8303] [10.7459] 
(iii) 150 Percent of Preferred Bandwidth 
Military Service  0.1251 0.1353  −0.2957  −0.3311  −0.1087  −0.0553 
  [0.1651] [0.1710] [0.4032] [0.4507] [0.4581] [0.5455] 
 
Notes:   In Panel A, odd columns report estimates using polynomials; even columns report spline-based 
estimates. In Panel B, odd columns report estimates based on the triangular kernel; even col-
umns report estimates based on the rectangular kernel. Wage and earnings are in 1995 DM. 
Bracketed numbers are robust standard errors clustered at the day of birth for Panel A and boot-
strapped using 500 replications for Panel B. The F-statistic and partial R2 are from the first-stage 




Alternative IV Estimates of the Returns to CMS 
 
  (log) Lifetime Average 
Daily Wage 
(log) Cumulative Days of 
Employment 
(log) Cumulative Lifetime 
Earnings 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Military Service  0.0912 0.0646  −0.0348  −0.0537  0.0565 0.0109 
  [0.0612] [0.0790] [0.1516] [0.2051] [0.1866] [0.2519] 
High School  0.1902*** 0.1941*** 0.2506*** 0.2534*** 0.4408*** 0.4475*** 
  [0.0050] [0.0068] [0.0146] [0.0211] [0.0173] [0.0247] 
University  0.2109*** 0.2120***  −0.1025***  −0.0888***  0.1085*** 0.1232*** 
  [0.0089] [0.0126] [0.0221] [0.0311] [0.0279] [0.0393] 
F-statistic  357.88 67.28 357.88 67.28 357.88 67.28 
Partial R
2  0.0103 0.0234 0.0103 0.0234 0.0103 0.0234 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations  22,008 9,322 22,008 9,322 22,008 9,322 
 
Notes:   Odd columns use the full sample; even columns use Birth Cohort 1936–1938. Wage and earn-
ings are in 1995 DM. Bracketed numbers are robust standard errors clustered at the day of birth. 
See text for the list of other control variables. The F-statistic and partial R2 are from the first-
stage regressions. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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